Hagaon
Rav Shalom
Noach Brozofsky zt”l on Parshat Matot
(from
Netivot
Shalom on the Torah)
Vows and the Heads
of the Tribes
Print Version
The Torah's presentation of the laws of nedarim
(vows) is directed at the heads of the tribes. This
non-standard opening is the textual basis of the
halakha that a great sage (chakham) can annul a
vow (perform hatarat nedarim) by himself (whereas
for normal Jews a court of three is required, like
we do on Erev Rosh Hashana). The Slonimer Rebbe,
in the Netivot Shalom on our Parsha, points out
a number of difficulties connected with this.
-
Annulling vows appears only later in the passage,
when it speaks of a husband or father annulling
a wife's or daughter's vow. Why does the law
of a sage annulling a vow appear at the opening
of the parsha and not later on?
- What
is behind this unique power that a sage has?
The husband's and father's ability to annul
can be explained as deriving from the woman's
special relationship with them, but where does
the sage's power come from, enabling him to
annul the vow of any Jew?
- The
whole concept of a vow is also a unique but
puzzling halakhic phenomenon. Where does this
ability to create a binding prohibition by a
mere verbal declaration come from? The ability
to sanctify a sacrifice (hekdesh) by a vow is
less problematic. A person verbally gives over
the animal to the Temple and it is then prohibited
for anyone to benefit from it. A vow, though,
can be created that only prohibits something
to one person. How?
- According to the Sifrei
Zuta, a non-Jew's vow is not halakhically binding. This seems inconsistent
with the halakha that a non-Jew's sacrifice is offered in the Temple
and has the status of hekdesh (sanctified property), with the prohibition
against benefit that goes with it. How can it be that a non-Jew saying,
"This piece of bread is prohibited," does not create a halakhically
binding vow, but the statement, "This animal is dedicated as a sacrifice
to the Temple," by a non-Jew does create a halakhically legitimate sacrifice?
His
answer is based on two assumptions:
A. Sanctifying speech is likened by Rabbeinu Yona
to placing an object inside a holy vessel of the
Temple. According to the halakha, something that
enters the vessel takes on the sanctity of the
vessel. Just as the mouth is holy, so the words
that go through it have holiness. This is the
source of the power of a vow - that a statement
of holiness can create a personal prohibition.
This would seemingly only apply to the sages and
holy men of Judaism, whose speech is so holy that
it can create such a prohibition. The sages of
the Beit Din (rabbinical court) can, for instance,
create the sanctity of the holidays through their
declaration of the new month. This is the explanation
given in the holy works for the juxtaposition
between the passage of vows (the beginning of
this week's parsha) and that of the holidays (the
end of the last). What of all of the rest of us,
the "normal" Jews?
B. For this, we need the second of the Netivot
Shalom's two assumptions (quoting the Torat Avot,
section Emunat Chakhamim), that the influx of
Divine good to the Jewish people in all the generations
comes down via its spiritual leaders. Similarly,
the power of sanctification through speech comes
down to normal Jews through the channel of their
intrinsic connection with their spiritual leaders.
Now the difficulties we mentioned above fit into
place.
This is why the law of annulling vows by a sage
is mentioned at the opening of the parsha, and
not along with the law of the father and husband.
The whole basis of the power to make vows is our
connection with the sages, the "heads of the tribes,"
who have the gift of high level sanctification
of speech. A sage annulling a vow takes away the
power that initially came through him. This is
why a vow annulled by a sage is retroactively
uprooted - as if it never existed - whereas when
a father or husband annuls his wife's or daughter's
vow it is only "cut off" from then on.
We can now also understand the reason why when
a non-Jew makes a vow it does not halakhically
take effect, but when he dedicates a sacrifice
to the Temple it has sanctity and is offered on
the altar. When he says, "This animal is sanctified
as a sacrifice," he legally transfers it to the
Temple and it thereby derives its status. Making
a vow, saying, "This object is prohibited to me,"
can only take effect through the connection to
the sages. He lacks this connection, and the power
of high level sanctification of speech that comes
with it. Declaring an animal a sacrifice, though,
only entails making a legal transfer of the animal
to the Temple (something that the non-Jew can
also do), not creating sanctity. The sanctity
comes automatically to anything under the Temple's
control. The power of vows, though, demands an
intrinsic connection with the sages and spiritual
leaders, the "heads of the tribes."
[prepared
by Eliezer Kwass]
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